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Nationalistic ideas of commerce . . . have contributed to those concep-
tions of national rivalry and hostility that are nowbearing such bitter fruit.
Possiblywemayyet forsake these ideas, and in time come to standwith the
small number of nations that believe international commerce to be not
economic warfare but actual international cooperation.1
(Henry Raymond Mussey)
The American economist Henry R. Mussey, writing in 1914,
expressed a fear that was not restricted to the United States.
Many worried that the First World War might so damage the
global economy that it would be difficult to kick-start it again.
Indeed, as the fighting dragged on, the warring parties no longer
aimed simply at military victory, but increasingly attempted to
weaken the opponent’s national economy. Using well-directed
blockade politics, the Allies attempted to shut down the Central
Powers’ foreign trade. Germany retaliated with a ruthless sub-
marine war that began in February 1915. The resulting obstruc-
tion of transport routes and shortage of shipping space seriously
impeded the regular provision of raw materials throughout the
war.
When writing about economic warfare between 1914 and
1918, historians have concentrated mostly on the macro-
perspective of national economies and on the decisions of par-
ticular cabinets that led to the naval blockade or the submarine
war.2 Despite its significance, the micro-perspective of firms has
*We would like to thank Erich Keller, Ju¨rgen Osterhammel, Niels P. Petersson,
Roman Rossfeld, Hansjo¨rg Siegenthaler and the six anonymous readers for Past and
Present for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1 Henry Raymond Mussey, ‘The New Freedom in Commerce’, in Political Science
Quarterly, xxix (1914), 625.
2 Among the myriad writings on this topic are Marc Frey, ‘Trade, Ships, and the
Neutrality of theNetherlands in the FirstWorldWar’, Int. Hist. Rev., xix (1997), 541–
62; Niall Fergusson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York, 1999), 248–
81; Hans-Peter Ullmann, ‘Kriegswirtschaft’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich
Past and Present, no. 207 (May 2010) The Past and Present Society, Oxford, 2010
doi:10.1093/pastj/gtq004
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only been examined in a rudimentary manner.3 Such a perspec-
tive, however, highlights the fact that measures of economic war-
fare touched fundamental cultural issues of global economic
interactions and affected the self-perception and national alle-
giance of international operating firms, since trade control was
applied by a series of administrativemeasures that sought to iden-
tify the national origins of commercial institutions and transac-
tions.
Throughout the secondpart of the longnineteenth century, the
nationality of companies had been of subordinate importance,
even after the 1880s, when protectionist currents in continental
Europe became stronger and resulted in a politicization of inter-
national trade.4 The period beginning in themid-nineteenth cen-
tury brought about a ‘truly cosmopolitan bourgeoisie trading
internationally under British naval protection’, as Charles A.
Jones notes.5 This period of economic cosmopolitanism ended
with the outbreak of the First WorldWar, and countries involved
in the war spared no effort in stripping down the transnational
framework of the world economy and putting national labels on
companies and goods. In this respect, the war played a catalytic
role for the politicization of the global economy, a trend which
had begun with the recurrence of protectionism on the European
continent in the late nineteenth century and peaked in the aboli-
tion of free trade after theGreatDepression and the emergence of
autarky policies in the 1930s.6 However, as Geoffrey Jones ob-
serves, it is usually very difficult to define the national origin of
nineteenth-century companies that operated on a world scale;
(n. 2 cont.)
and Irina Renz (eds.), Enzyklopa¨die Erster Weltkrieg (Paderborn, 2003), 220–32;
Stephan Broadberry and Mark Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War I
(Cambridge, 2005).
3 An exception is Roman Rossfeld and Tobias Straumann (eds.), Der vergessene
Wirtschaftskrieg: Schweizer Unternehmen im Ersten Weltkrieg (Zu¨rich, 2008).
4 On the politicization of international trade after 1880, compare: Harold James,
The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, MA and
London, 2001), 13–25; Ju¨rgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, Geschichte der
Globalisierung: Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen (Mu¨nchen, 2003), 26, 69ff. The argu-
ment that governments were not interested in the nationality of enterprises before
1914 is also put forward by Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism
(Oxford, 2005), 282.
5 Charles A. Jones, International Business in the Nineteenth Century: The Rise and Fall
of a Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie (Brighton, 1987), 2.
6 James, End of Globalization.
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depending on the criterion applied—be it the home country of
the company founders, the country of residence of its sharehold-
ers, the location of the headquarters, or the company’s principal
area of operation—certain companies could legitimately be
attributed several nationalities.7 During the war, the belligerent’s
bureaucracies divided such companies arbitrarily along national
lines that were often incompatible with the companies’ business
practices and their self-perception, forcing them to adopt, or even
actively promote, a particular national affiliation, in order to sur-
vive the war period unscathed.
This article seeks to address these issues by presenting the ex-
perience ofmultinational trading companieswithheadquarters in
neutral Switzerland whose business was predominantly import
and export between Europe and Asia.8 Since the nineteenth cen-
tury, foreign observers had regularly been astonished by the
strong presence of Swiss merchants on the Asian–European trad-
ing market, especially since Switzerland had no colonies.9 Yet,
since their home market was too small for the volume of their
sales, and since many nations on the European continent closed
off their markets at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Swiss
industrial firms therefore had to find consumers overseas. As a
result, Switzerland, togetherwithBelgiumandGreatBritain,was
among the most export-oriented countries in Europe: between
1909 and 1911 over 25 per cent of all Swiss exports went to over-
seas markets, mainly through Swiss merchants established in the
respective regions. Asia, in particular, was an excellentmarket for
Swiss manufactured goods.10 From the late nineteenth century,
7 Geoffrey Jones, ‘The End of Nationality? Global Firms and ‘‘Borderless
Worlds’’’, Zschr. fu¨r Unternehmensgeschichte, li (2006), 149–65.
8 On the economic situation in Switzerland during the First World War, see:
Peter Heinrich Schmidt, Der Wirtschaftskrieg und die Neutralen (Zu¨rich, 1918); on
the effects of the war on the economy of another neutral country, The Netherlands,
seeHermande Jong, ‘Between theDevil and theDeepBlue Sea:TheDutchEconomy
DuringWorldWar I’, in Broadberry andHarrison (eds.),The Economics of World War I
(Cambridge, 2005), 137–68.
9 Se´bastien Guex, ‘The Development of Swiss Trading Companies in the
Twentieth Century’, in Geoffrey Jones (ed.), The Multinational Traders (London and
New York, 1998), 150–72.
10 Paul Bairoch, ‘Le Volume des exportations de la Suisse de 1851 a` 1975’,
Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu¨r Geschichte, xxviii (1978), 29–50; Be´atrice Veyrassat, ‘La
Suisse sur les marche´s du monde: Exportations globales et re´partition ge´ographique
au XIXe sie`cle. Essai de reconstruction’, in Paul Bairoch and Martin Ko¨rner (eds.),
Die Schweiz in der Weltwirtschaft (15.–20. Jh.) (Zu¨rich, 1990), 287–316.
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Swiss merchant houses not only exported goods to Asia but also
imported rawmaterials such as cotton from India or rubber from
the Dutch East Indies to Europe. Due to the policy of free trade
which theBritish pursued in their colonies, Swiss traders gained a
strong position in the South East and South Asian trade and were
able to extend their networks to Siam, French Indochina and the
Dutch East Indies.
Alongside smaller companies, this articlewill focus on the firms
Volkart Bros. and Diethelm & Co., both of which originated in
German-speaking Switzerland andwere among the biggest Swiss
trading houses in this period. Due to the nature of their business
activities, private trading companies generally operated trans-
nationally. Such companies were much more seriously affected
by deteriorating international relations than were industrial en-
terprises, which still had domestic markets on which to concen-
trate their operations. Thus, firms such as Volkart Bros and
Diethelm & Co. are excellent examples for case studies of the
effects that the war had on individual businesses in global
trade.11 Furthermore, an examination of the experiences of trad-
ing houses operating in Asia reveals the economic effects of the
First World War in a global light, something that until now has
rarely been done,12 and can demonstrate that the consequences
of economic warfare were also felt in regions as remote from the
European battlefields as South and South-east Asia. In these co-
lonial regions, economic actors had been classified primarily as
either European orAsian. After the outbreak of thewar, however,
the nationality of European merchants suddenly became crucial.
From a theoretical perspective, therefore, the experience of Swiss
trading houses during the First World War calls for a business
history that understands enterprises not only as organizations
that buy and sell goods or services, but also as historically grown
11 On the history of multinational trading companies in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, see Stanley Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the
Industrial Revolution to World War I (Cambridge, 1992); Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to
Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
(Oxford and New York, 2000).
12 Ju¨rgen Osterhammel, ‘Globalgeschichte’, in Hans-Ju¨rgen Goertz (ed.),
Geschichte: Ein Grundkurs (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2007), 600–1. Exceptions, of
course, are Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford,
1989), and Philip Dehne, ‘From ‘‘Business as Usual’’ to a More Global War: The
British Decision to AttackGermans in South America during the FirstWorldWar’, Jl
Brit. Stud., xliv (2005), 516–35.
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entities. This understanding requires an examination of the
companies’ embeddedness in their political, social and cultural
environment.13 Likewise, it seems appropriate to consider the
national affiliation of firms not so much as a long-standing char-
acteristic that can be verified objectively, but as the result of a
process of cultural construction which has to be analysed within
its historical context.
In considering Swiss trading companies in South and South-
east Asia, this article provides insights into these processes. Part I
describes Great Britain’s war economy measures and Part II
shows the effect they had on the trading of goods and on the
organization of the business of Swiss trading companies. The
article then sets out, in Part III, to reveal how the question of
the companies’ national affiliation became more and more sig-
nificant as a result of the increasingly restrictive nature of the
decrees formulated by the warring parties. Part IV deals with
the honorary consulates founded during the course of the First
World War, which led to closer ties between Swiss trading com-
panies and the Swiss state, and the final section (Part V) discusses
the effects of thewar on the business activities and self-perception
of Swiss trading companies after 1918.
I
GREAT BRITAIN’S MEASURES OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
On the eve of theFirstWorldWar, global integration in the flowof
trade, finance and communication had reached a level that would
not be achieved again until the end of the twentieth century.With
the outbreak of war, this flow suddenly slowed and, eventually,
international trade was completely stalled for several months.14
The disruptions were not so much the result of the conflicting
13 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness’, Amer. Jl. of Sociology, xci (1985), 481–510; Hartmut Berghoff,
Zwischen Kleinstadt und Weltmarkt: Hohner und die Harmonika, Unternehmensgeschichte
als Gesellschaftsgeschichte (Paderborn, Mu¨nchen, Wien, Zu¨rich, 1997).
14 On economic globalization prior to 1914 and the effect of the FirstWorldWar on
the global economy, see Patrick O’Brien, ‘The Great War and the Dislocation of the
International Economy 1914–1929’, in Wilfried Feldenkirchen, Frauke Scho¨nert-
Ro¨hlk and Gu¨nther Schulz (eds.), Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Unternehmen: Festschrift
fu¨r Hans Pohl zum 60. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 1995), 245–65; Cornelius Torp,
‘Weltwirtschaft vor dem Weltkrieg: Die erste Welle der o¨konomischen
Globalisierung vor 1914’, Hist. Zschr., cclxxix (2004), 561–609; Youssef Cassis, Les
Capitales du Capital (Geneva, 2005), 99–102 and 185.
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parties’ war economy measures, but had their origin in the tem-
porary shutdown of most international banks and stock-markets
at the beginning of the war. Great Britain, for example, was slow
to introduce measures of economic warfare in 1914— free trade,
after all, was one of themajor pillars of British economic policy.15
Both entrepreneurs and the Asquith government took the view
that restricting trade would have adverse effects on the British
economy, and the British Cabinet, accordingly, in 1914 declared
that ‘business as usual’ should continue, and prohibited trade
only with German-based companies. Even British subsidiary
companies of large German firms, such as Daimler Benz or
Siemens, were not subject to the restrictions at first; the trade
war was initially aimed in large part only at blocking the flow of
goods (primarily raw materials) into and out of the German
Reich, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.16
Towards the end of 1914,when it became clear that therewould
be no immediate end to the hostilities, the desire for more effect-
ive measures to stop trade with the Central Powers grew stronger
among the British public, and, from early 1915 until mid-1916,
trade was continuously restricted. British controlling agencies
began to set their sights on the neutral countries in particular,
because trade statistics were showing that the import of com-
modities in neutral countries such as the Netherlands, the
Scandinavian countries and Switzerland had greatly increased
since the beginning of the war.17 The Allies took this to mean
that the neutrals acted as trading posts for supplies that were
being delivered to the Central Powers. Accordingly, on 23
December 1915, Great Britain passed a law stating that ‘His
Majesty may by Proclamation prohibit all persons . . . resident,
carrying on business, or being in the United Kingdom from
15 See Georges-Henri Soutou, L’Or et le Sang: Les Buts de Guerre Economiques de la
Premie`re Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1985), 196–203; Anthony Howe, Free Trade and
Liberal England, 1846–1946 (Oxford, 1997); Frank Trentmann, ‘National Identity
and Consumer Politics’, in Patrick O’Brien et al. (eds.), The Political Economy of
British Historical Experience 1688–1914 (Oxford, 2002), 187–214.
16 John Mc Dermott, ‘Trading with the Enemy: British Business and the Law
During the First World War’, Canadian Jl Hist., xxxii (1997), 201–20.
17 Within the cabinet, several ministries were involved in trade politics: the tradi-
tionally liberal Board of Trade, the Foreign Office and the consulates and embassies
connected to it, theHomeOffice for companies locatedwithin theUK, theWarTrade
Department, and finally theAdmiralty, which controlled the transport of goods at sea.
See McDermott ‘Trading with the Enemy’, 207; Soutou, L’Or et le Sang, 203–10;
MarionC.Siney,The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914–1916 (AnnArbor, 1957), 75–8.
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trading with any persons . . . whenever by reason of the enemy
nationality or enemy association of such persons . . . it appears to
his Majesty expedient so to do’.18 With these regulations, Great
Britain went far beyond the scope of trade law as it had been
commonly practised up to that point. Trade controls were no
longer confined to direct trade with the enemy but, by means of
what was virtually a secondary boycott, drew neutral countries
into the economic hostility of the warring parties. The driving
forces behind this tightening of regulations were the increasing
pressure from the public, a certain administrative fervour and,
finally, the opportunism of British firms which, since their own
freedom of trade was restricted, wanted to ensure that the field of
activity of their competitors from neutral countries was also lim-
ited.19 In the United States, the largest of the affected countries,
the new regulations were met with deep resentment. From the
start, it was suspected that the measures had been implemented
not only to assist the war effort but also to aid the economic inter-
ests of British companies in their trade rivalry with US firms.
Foreign minister Sir Edward Grey defended the British position
in an article published in the New York Times. According to Grey,
the new regulationswere intendedmerely to control British trade,
while giving neutral states free choice as to whom they should
cultivate trade relations with.20
The terms ‘enemy nationality’ and ‘enemy association’, how-
ever, allowed formuch interpretational leeway.As a result,where-
as nationality had hitherto been only a secondary issue for
companies, during thewar it became amajor criterion in business
routines. The numerous questions facing both Allied and neutral
companies canbedivided into twogroups: the firstwas the origin,
transport and destination of goods, the second was the national
origin of a company. The significance of these questions and the
possible answers continually changed according to place and
time.
18 ‘Trading with the enemy (Extension of Powers) 5 & 6’, cited from ‘The British
Black List’, Harvard Law Rev., xxx (1917), 279.
19 Philip Dehne, for instance, points out how British merchants in neutral South
American countries campaigned (successfully in the end) for leaving the policy of
‘business as usual’ and extending the measures of economic warfare to merchants in
neutral countries in order to derogate the business of their German competitors:
Dehne, ‘From ‘‘Business as Usual’’ to a More Global War’.




To examine the origin and destination of goods, the following
criteria were applied:
 Licences and certificates for the acquisition of commodities
were used to prevent their sale to the Central Powers.
 Certificates of origin were issued for manufactured goods or
their parts.
 The country of origin depended on the vessel that trans-
ported goods; in the case of a neutral vessel the nationality
of goods was the decisive factor.
To ascertain the nationality of companies, the following criteria
were adopted:
 The registered location of the head office of the company
(this had been the most common legal criterion up until
the outbreak of the war).
 The nationality of the owners: in 1915, Great Britain began
to adopt the stricter regulation of France, according towhich
the citizenship of the owners defined the nationality of a
company.
 The nationality of senior staff: in Allied territory, Germans
and Austrians were detained; in neutral territory, companies
risked being seen as an ‘enemy company’ if they had staff
from Central Power nations.
 German-friendliness: with the term ‘enemy association’,
political attitudes became an issue of debate.
 Consular protection: before 1914, Swiss companies in Asia
had normally been under the consular protection of either
the German Reich or the USA.
With the implementation of its war economymeasures, Britain
ventured into new administrative territory: laws had to be passed,
juridical practice established, and administrators appointed. For
each aspect of economic warfare there were different laws (price
law, ‘trading with the enemy’ act), various administrative bodies,
and numerous means of gathering information (freight docu-
ments, censorship of mail and telegrams, police investigations
and espionage21). While the prize law was mainly aimed at
21 For example, the British kept a cover firm in Switzerland which, through its own
business activities, collected informationonSwiss companies and their tradepartners:
The National Archives, London (TNA), FO 382/429.
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physical control of the movement of goods at sea, the measures
relating to ‘trading with the enemy’ were directed at controlling
the operations of Allied companies. Not only was their trade with
German and Austrian companies prohibited, their dealings with
neutral companieswere alsomonitored.Whereas ‘hard’ issues—
such as the nationality of a company’s owners or the place where
the firm was registered—could be verified or refuted in case of a
lawsuit, ‘soft’ issues—such as assumed German-friendliness of
the staff— left much of room for ambiguity and were subject to a
warfare of amore ideological kind. In all areas, theAllies betrayed
the principle that had been painstakingly established in the nine-
teenth century which held that war was not to be aimed at enemy
citizens and their property, but only at the enemy state.22
Since only Great Britain, as the leading naval power, actually
possessed the means to enforce its economic sanctions globally,
trade from Asia was controlled mainly by Britain. The British
navy regularly stopped suspicious vessels under a neutral flag to
clarify details concerning the receivers of goods. Generally, con-
trol measures focused on movement of goods to the European
continent. With respect to the freedom of the seas, they were
carried out at the beginning of the war in accordance with the
1909 Declaration of London. Soon, however, Great Britain ex-
tended the prize law’s area of application— in large part due to
the pressure exerted by France. As a result, the reprisal orders of
11 March 1915, drawn up in reaction to the German submarine
activity in British waters, allowed Great Britain to confiscate
enemy goods under a neutral flag.23 Furthermore, the list of con-
ditional and absolute contrabands was extended considerably.
Absolute contraband included war materials such as weapons,
ammunition and materials that could be made into war goods,
while conditional contraband included civil goods that might be
intended for use by the enemy army.24 The list of contraband
22 Heinz Ochsenbein, Die verlorene Wirtschaftsfreiheit 1914–1918: Methoden ausla¨n-
discher Wirtschaftskontrollen u¨ber die Schweiz (Bern, 1971), 129;Tor Egil Førland, ‘The
History of Economic Warfare: International Law, Effectiveness, Strategies’, Jl Peace
Research, xxx (1993), 151–62.
23 Siney, Allied Blockade of Germany, 61–74.
24 The terms absolute and relative contraband are taken from international marine
law and indicate (smuggled) goods on neutral vessels thatmay be captured bywarring
countries under certain circumstances:HaroldReasonPyke,The Law of Contraband of
War (Oxford, 1915); Siney, Allied Blockade of Germany, 21–3.
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goods that could be confiscated, set out in the 1909 Declaration
of London, had been limited exclusively to war materials.
However, byOctober 1914, theAllies’ list of absolute contraband
had already grown to 196 items including, for example,wool, silk,
rubber, tin, copper and colouring matter, and by 1916 this
included almost every commodity that was transported by
sea—and this in spite of the neutrals’ protests against the restric-
tion on their freedom of trade. The United States, with its polit-
ical and economic clout, was alone in combating (at least
temporarily) the measures put in place by the Allies.25
For manufactured goods, Great Britain introduced so-called
‘certificates of origin’. With very few exceptions, the neutrals had
to provide these certificates for the export of all products to guar-
antee that theyweremanufactured in the country of export. Since
end products often included parts that came fromdifferent coun-
tries, Great Britain determined in 1915 that no more than 25 per
cent of a product’s value could be material of enemy origin.26
The rules against ‘trading with the enemy’ applied first of all
solely to commerce between companies of the warring countries.
As the war progressed, Great Britain influenced the economy of
the neutral countries by attempting to control their movement of
goods as well as their business activities. As of December 1915,
the British government was authorized to ban trade with compa-
nies from neutral countries if they maintained business relations
with companies from enemy territory. These measures were im-
plemented through the introduction of several lists: the blacklists
included German- or Austrian-owned companies in neutral
countries and companies that were known to be sympathetic to
the Central Powers. Companies could also be blacklisted if they
had Austrian or German managers, or traded with companies
from countries belonging to the Central Powers. Any trade with
blacklisted companies was prohibited. For the four largest,
non-western neutrals—namely Morocco, Persia, Siam and
China— the restrictions were still more comprehensive: British
companies were allowed to trade only with businesses from these
countries if they were included on a white-list.
25 Ochsenbein, Die verlorene Wirtschaftsfreiheit, 125–7.
26 TNA, CO 675/43: Memorandum for the Guidance of His Majesty’s Consular
Officers in issuing Certificates of Origin, 15 July 1915; see also: Siney, Allied Blockade
of Germany, 84–6.
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The procedure for blacklisting included the preliminary gath-
ering of information, the provisional listing of a company in case
of suspicion and the subsequent consultation of chambers of
commerce and financial interests to ascertain what objections
existed against a listing. Nevertheless, British officials were
aware that the blacklisting of neutral companies could harm
their own country’s business interests, and that British trade
could lose partners for export that could not easily be replaced.
The implementation of the measures of war economy caused
more than its share of problems. Throughout 1915 and 1916, the
British Foreign Office was swamped with enquiries from compa-
nies demanding to know why a shipment was blocked from a
particular harbour, whether a certain company would be per-
mitted as a trading partner, or why their trading partner of
many years suddenly appeared on a blacklist. The documenta-
tion reveals a certain strain on the authorities who, with the ex-
tensive trade control regulations, were in new administrative
territory. Owing to a traditional lack of competence in other lan-
guages, British public servants produced mix-ups andmisunder-
standings on a daily basis. Goods were repeatedly blocked
because the instructions issued were imprecise or because har-
bour inspectors were not clear about the black- and white-lists’
areas of application.27 In case of doubt, goods were blocked and
the decision left to the courts of justice. One intention of
the British Government was to pressure neutral powers into
founding bodies of trade control as demanded by the Allies,
such as the Netherlands’ Overseas Trust or the Socie´te´ Suisse
de Surveillance e´conomique. Since these boards had to guarantee
that no products of strategic relevance could be exported to the
Central Powers, they permitted the Allies to exert considerable
influence on the economy of neutral countries.28
27 As one of many examples, the company Sturzenegger & Co. in Penang was
denied delivery of a supply of goods and given the explanation that they were not on
the white-list. However, there were no white-lists for the British colonies: TNA, CO
48192/1915. A plethora of such cases can be found in The National Archives, cate-
gorized by country and listed under the ForeignOffice, theColonial Office, the Board
of Trade and other bodies. Cases from Switzerland, Singapore, Siam and the Dutch
East Indies were used in this study.
28 For dealingswith theAllied countries, Switzerland established the Socie´te´ Suisse
de Surveillance e´conomique (S.S.S.); for dealings with the Central Powers, there was
the Schweizerische Treuhandstelle (S.T.S.) (Swiss Trust Agency): Max Obrecht, Die
kriegswirtschaftlichen U¨berwachungsgesellschaften S.S.S. und S.T.S. und insbesondere ihre
Syndikate (Bern, 1920); Ochsenbein, Die verlorene Wirtschaftsfreiheit; Siney, Allied
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II
THE IMPACT ON SWISS TRADING HOUSES
How were Swiss trading companies in Asia affected by British
wartime protectionism? Swiss trading companies operating in
Asia usually had close business connections with German and
Austrian trading partners. Consequently, they were hit hard by
the prohibition of business contactswith customers and suppliers
from the countries of the Central Powers, as the following ex-
amples of Volkart Bros. and Diethelm & Co. demonstrate.
Volkart Bros. was the largest Swiss trading house at this time,
and had been engaged in a lively import and export trade between
India and Europe, representing numerous European shipping
and insurance companies on the subcontinent since the 1850s.
During the FirstWorldWar, the company had its headquarters in
Winterthur, north-east of Zurich (at that time it was fully owned
by theWinterthur-basedmerchant family, Reinhart), a branch in
London, six in British India, and one in Ceylon. While the com-
pany’s activitiesweremultifaceted, its focuswas on exporting raw
cotton from India toEurope andEastAsia.Around the turnof the
century, Volkart, along with the Greek-British company Ralli
Brothers, had become the most important exporter of Indian
cotton to Europe.29
The trading houseDiethelm&Co.was founded byWilhelmH.
Diethelm and was one of the many medium-sized Swiss firms at
Asian trading ports in this period. In 1871, Diethelm was em-
ployed as a merchant with Hooglandt & Co. in Singapore; by the
mid-l880s he had acquired the controlling interest in this Dutch
trading company. At the same time, he founded the trading house
in Zurich bearing his name, Diethelm & Co., which alongside its
major branch office in British Singapore, operated branches in
French Saigon and neutral Bangkok, and owned plantations in
theDutch East Indies. Hooglandt &Co. was kept in business as a
subsidiary. Diethelm’s controlling interest was Swiss-based, with
(n. 28 cont.)
Blockade of Germany, 34–44. On the Netherlands’ Overseas Trust see Frey, ‘Trade,
Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands in the First World War’.
29 On the history of the Volkart company, see Walter H. Rambousek, Armin Vogt
andHansR.Volkart,Volkart: The History of a World Trading Company (Frankfurt a.M.,
1990).
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the Diethelm family owning a large proportion of the shares after
the firm became a limited company in 1907. The enterprise also
had foreign shareholders; a quarter of the shares were
Dutch-owned. Moreover, until 1914, Diethelm profited from
one, albeit minor, German contributor of capital. The company
exported manufactured European goods to South-east Asia
(mainly textiles but also metalware, silverware, porcelain, and
chemicals), operated local offices for several insurance compa-
nies, and was actively involved in the plantation business in
Malaysia and Sumatra as well as the tin and oil trade within
Asia.30
The outbreak of the war was a critical event for these interna-
tional trading companies as long-established modes of payment
abruptly became dysfunctional and outstanding exchanges could
no longer be redeemed. At the outset of the war, international
communication came to a complete standstill. Diethelm’s head
office inZurich, for instance, did not know for some timewhether
its branches had received its instructions to adopt the rules of war
economy, which included an immediate halt on all purchase
orders and detailed instructions concerning payment transac-
tions.31 Although it was not long before international communi-
cation and payment transactions were restored, trading
companies suffered from the increasingly heavy restrictions on
trade. As each company had branches both within and outside
the British Empire, each branch was affected by the measures of
economic warfare in a different way.
From the outset of the war, companies operating in territories
controlled by the Allies were prohibited from delivering orders to
countries of theCentral Powers. This caused significant stoppage
of goods traffic. Following the outbreak of the war, Volkart was
left with almost 127,000 bales of raw cotton which, for the most
part, had been ordered by customers fromAustria andGermany.
The value of the blocked cotton was more than £1 million.
Despite the sale of the bulk of it subsequently to British custom-
ers, after fifteen months Volkart was still left with more than
30 On the history of the Diethelm company, see Jakob Eggenberger, Das Haus
Diethelm im Wandel der Zeit, 1887–1987 (Zu¨rich, 1987); Friedemann Bartu, The Fan
Tree Company: Three Swiss Merchants in Asia (Zu¨rich, 2005).
31 Diethelm-Archiv, Zurich (DA), 2.2: Hans Schweizer-Iten, ‘Das Haus Diethelm
1860–1973’, unpublished manuscript 1973, 717.
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21,000 bales of cotton from this inventory.32 German and
Austrian spinning companies also contacted Volkart repeatedly,
suggesting that the cotton be shipped to neutral harbours such as
Venice, Genoa or Rotterdam, whence the goods could be sent
indirectly to their destination countries. Volkart, however, cat-
egorically refused, since a violation of the ‘trading with the
enemy’ act could have led to the liquidation of large portions of
the enterprise located in the British Empire. ‘This is not a matter
of goodwill or ill-will. It is an absolute exigency’, Volkart told a
German spinning company in April 1915, ‘We do not believe you
seriously expect us to put the existence of our house at risk for
1,100 bales of cotton’.33
Despite these difficulties and the fact that turnover on cotton
was at most only half of what it had been in the 1913/14 season,34
the war years were very successful for Volkart. In 1917, the com-
pany evenmade one of the highest net profits in its history, reach-
ing anominal 4.9millionSwiss francs.35Volkart profited from the
increase in raw material prices after 1916, which allowed the
trading house to widen its margins. The company was also able
partially to compensate for the loss of its important central
European markets with more exports to Japan, and by intensify-
ing its trade business within India.36
Great Britain’s impact was stronger in the rubber trade than in
cotton because the British Empire was the most important pro-
ducer of plantation-grown rubber and much of the worldwide
rubber trade went through London and Singapore.37 The fact
that natural rubber was declared absolute contraband (unlike
cotton, which was relative contraband) was at least partly due
32 Jakob Anderegg, Volkart Brothers 1851–1976: A Chronicle, Vol. II (Winterthur,
1976), 245–7.
33 Volkart-Archiv, Winterthur (VA), Dossier 42 – Rechtliches, Cotton Business
Germany 1st World War: Winterthur an Mech. Baumwoll-Spinnerei & Weberei,
Augsburg, 23 Apr. 1915.
34 VA, Dossier 8 – Karachi/3: copy of sales 1913–19.
35 VA, Dossier 61 – ex GR perso¨nliches Archiv I: Graphische Tabellen: Verha¨ltnis
von Stammkapital zu Gewinn und Verlust.
36 Anderegg, Volkart Brothers, 251–5.
37 Eric T. Brice, Rubber Shares as Investments: A Brief Analysis of the Position of the
Leading Companies in the Malay Peninsula, Java and Sumatra, Intended as an Aid to
Investors (London, 1912); Walther Schmidt and Georg Heise, Kautschuk: Produktion,
Handel und Konsum (¼world trade atlas: production, trade and consumption of the
most significant international merchandise with numerous maps, diagrams and sta-
tistics, with explanatory text, Vol. 15) (Berlin-Lichterfelde, 1927); John H. Drabble,
Rubber in Malaya, 1876–1922: The Genesis of the Industry (Kuala Lumpur, 1973).
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to the interests ofBritish companies and investors.GreatBritain’s
competitors at the time camemainly from neutral countries such
as the Netherlands and the United States and less from enemy
countries. As the Netherlands, with rubber plantations in
Sumatra, was the second largest producer and by far the greatest
importer, the British took advantage of the war to attempt to
monopolize trade. Sir Frank Swettenham, who had been British
governor-general inMalaysia from 1896 to 1901, wrote, in 1916,
in the Times Trade Supplement: ‘The important thing for us is
that this new and most valuable industry . . . was created by
British foresight and energy, was developed by British capital
and will remain in British hands’.38 Arthur Lampard, one of the
most prominent lobbyists for natural rubber production and
trade, put pressure on the Foreign Office in 1915 to grant the
Netherlands only sufficient natural rubber tomeet that country’s
own needs: any surplus from theDutch colonieswas to be sold on
British markets.39 Swiss trading companies in Singapore were
affected by these special-interest politics. The company Jaeger
& Co., for example, operated a gambier and rubber plantation
on Sumatra. In December 1914, the firm requested an import
licence fromGreatBritain for 25 tons of raw rubber, guaranteeing
that the entire amount would be used in Switzerland. But, in
order to pressure Switzerland into founding an agency that con-
trolledSwiss economy (whichwould later be theSocie´te´ Suisse de
Surveillance e´conomique), Britain refused to grant the licence.
As result, the acute scarcity of rubber was one of the factors that
eventually caused the Federal Council of Switzerland to give in to
the British demands.40
In contrast to regulatory enforcement of the commodity trade
to Europe, that of the export trade of European manufactured
goods toAsiawas less strict.Nevertheless,Diethelm encountered
problems with the delivery of their goods to Asia because they
were forced to find new suppliers to replace the former German
ones—submarine activity alsomade the flowof goods uncertain.
Yet warehouses in Asia were relatively well stocked at the begin-
ning of the war and it was expected that purchasing levels at
38 The Times Trade Supplement: Rubber, P.1, Dec. 1916, cited from Drabble,
Rubber in Malaya, 154–5.
39 Guildhall Library London, Harrisons & Crosfield Papers, Ms 37041, Box 2:
Lampard to Foreign Office, correspondence 9/10 1915.
40 Ochsenbein, Die verlorene Wirtschaftsfreiheit, 151–4.
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bazaars would decrease during the war. Also, the possibility arose
of transferring stocks from the seized Austrian company
Dalmann & Co. in Singapore, although the integration of their
stocks into Diethelm’s commercial operations proved difficult,
due to communication problems causedby thewar.41Altogether,
the problems involved in exporting European manufactured
goods to Asia were relatively minor, which is why the subject
came up only rarely in Diethelm’s administrative protocols.
Swissmerchants in Asia were affected not only because of what
they did, but also because of who they were. The organization of
the company— that is, of the management and shareholders
as well as the consular protection under which the companies
operated—became relevant issues under the ‘trading with the
enemy’ act. While the movement of goods was mainly controlled
by the harbour authorities, officers who investigated contact with
the enemy relied on the censoring of letters and telegrams and on
information from the police and secret service. Mail and tele-
grams were systematically supervised from the outset of the
war. Along with the loss of mail caused by submarine activity,
censorship made in-house correspondence problematic because
letters could be held by the censoring body for a prolonged period
of time. Furthermore, telegrams were no longer allowed to be
encoded, causing problems for the operation of businesses—
since the secrecy of business offers and pricing was essential to
trading houses. As a result, the overall volume of telegrams be-
tween Switzerland and British India was reduced to barely a third
of what it had been in the year immediately preceding the war.42
‘We have been fully transported back to the times of our ancestors
who had to make do without telegraphy, when mail from India
took four weeks to arrive’, wrote an employee at Volkart in
November 1914.43 The communication problems caused by
the war were indeed great for globally operating trading compa-
nies, because the success of their business depended, as a rule, on
quickly communicated instructions and information on supply,
41 DA, A 3.21: private correspondence of W. H. Diethelm with managers: M.
Stadermann to W. H. Diethelm, 20 Nov. 1914; Eggenberger, Das Haus Diethelm im
Wandel der Zeit, 171, 174.
42 Schweizerisches Bundesblatt: Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung u¨ber
seine Gescha¨ftsfu¨hrung, Vols. 66–71 (Bern, 1913–18).
43 VA, Dossier 42 – Rechtliches, Cotton Business Germany First World War:
Gebru¨der Volkart, Winterthur, to J.H. Reitz, Chemnitz, 18 Nov. 1914.
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demand, product quality and payment arrangements. Censor-
ship also brought with it the danger of certain statements in the
correspondence awakening suspicion that British war regulations
were being violated. For this reason, a manager in Singapore
pointed out to the Zurich headquarters as early as 1914 that
any mail from Zurich put the Singapore branch in jeopardy be-
cause it could be construed as evidence for the ‘import of certain
goods’.44
Volkart and Diethelm were at pains to avoid any conflict with
the British authorities. Very early in the war, Wilhelm H.
Diethelm paid off the heirs of the last German shareholder. In
other respects, as well, connections with the Central Powers were
broken off. The branches in Singapore and Bangkok withdrew
from the consular protection of the German Reich and found
representation by the local US consulates. The managers in
Singapore in particular urged the other branches, and the head
office, to abide strictly by the ‘obligations in respect to the ene-
mies of Great Britain’.45
Despite all their prudence, both companies found themselves
in critical situations several times during the war. In the summer
of 1915, the British censoring authority intercepted letters writ-
ten by two Volkart employees which contained negative remarks
about the Allies. As a result, one of the employees (an American
citizen who was working for Volkart in Colombo) was expelled
from the country, while the other, who was on holiday in Europe
at the time, was prevented from returning to India.46 Both em-
ployees were laid off immediately and the company strongly
advised all employees to ‘strictly refrain’ in their private corres-
pondence ‘from any discussions of the war, of politics and any
related questions’.47 In the wake of the incident, the branch in
Colombo was searched by British authorities. Because most of
the company’s documentation was written in German, it was
taken in for closer examination and returned only several days
later. Nothing suspicious was found.48
44 DA, A 3.21: private correspondence of W. H. Diethelm with managers:
Stadermann to W. H. Diethelm, 20 Nov. 1914.
45 DA, 2.2: Hans Schweizer-Iten, ‘Das Haus Diethelm 1860-1973’, unpublished
manuscript 1973, p. 720.
46 VA, Dossier 6 – Colombo: 4. Table of Events.
47 VA, Dossier 18 – Winterthur I: 1. Table of Events: Bombay, circular, 22 Oct.
1915.
48 VA, Dossier 6 – Colombo: 4. Table of Events.
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In August 1916, British authorities focused their attention on
Volkart a second time. Ellison & Co., a British company repre-
senting Volkart in Liverpool, informed the Swiss enterprise that,
in future,Volkartwouldbe able to conduct its business only under
the surveillance of the British Board of Trade. Volkart andEllison
believed that the problem had been caused by British business
rivals who had blackened Volkart’s name among British authori-
ties as an easy way of disposing of a competitor. Following a
heated correspondence with the British authorities, and the pres-
entation of evidence which proved that the company had at all
times followed directives, Volkart finally received permission to
continue business without British supervision.49
Diethelm Bangkok was even blacklisted for a short time. In
spite of instructions from Zurich to the contrary, the managers
in Bangkok had taken an exceedingly long time to exchange their
German consular protection for protection by the US consulate.
Thiswould hardly have landed the branch on a blacklist had not a
Swiss rival business, Berli & Co., in a letter to the British autho-
rities, distanced itself from the ‘German-friendly behaviour’ of
Diethelm’s managers.50 It is difficult to say whether the Berli ex-
ecutives actually feared that the political attitude of Diethelm’s
managers might damage the Swiss community in Bangkok, or
whether they simply seized the opportunity to cast a positive
light on themselves at Diethelm’s expense. The latter seems
plausible in so far as Berli still had German shareholders and
was suspected of doing business with Germany. In any case, the
manoeuvre was successful. A British report from Bangkok
described the political orientation of the local Diethelm branch
as follows: ‘Their sympathies are such, that they might well be
regarded as of enemy nationality’.51 As a result, Diethelm
Bangkok was put on the list of ‘enemy companies’. Only when
the Chartered Bank of India in London intervened with the
British government in support of Diethelm was the name taken
off the list in September 1915.52
49 Anderegg, Volkart Brothers, 248.
50 DA, A 3.13: Correspondence Zurich Bangkok, 1915.
51 TNA, FO 371/2465, Paper 139987: Memorandum of 28 Sept. 1915 by the
British Consulate in Siam to the Foreign Office.
52 Bartu, The Fan Tree Company, 83.
198 PASTAND PRESENT NUMBER 207
 
These examples demonstrate that Swiss trading houses de-
pended on good connections with the British business commu-
nity in order to continue trade within the territory of the Empire.
The dramatic impact which the strictures of war economy could
have on a trading company without such connections, in cases
where the British regarded their attitude as ambiguous, is seen in
the case of the Basel Trading Co. This company was founded in
India in 1859 by Basel missionaries and had a successful trading
business in India and on the Gold Coast (nowGhana). The high
proportion of German employees and shareholders in the com-
pany, however, attracted the suspicion of the Indian government.
From 1916, Basel Trading Co. India was under British supervi-
sion and threatened with liquidation. From 1918, the same was
also true for its subsidiary on theGoldCoast.53 The trading com-
pany then made an effort to cut connections with its German
shareholders as well as with the Basel Mission—over which the
Britishwere keeping a carefulwatchdue to its connectionwith the
South-west German Mission. Nevertheless, all the company’s
efforts failed, even though local British authorities had been in-
structed by the Foreign Office to be tolerant of neutral trading
companies who were willing to co-operate, and in spite of the
Swiss authorities’ attempt at diplomatic intervention. After the
end of the war, its overseas possessions in India and the Gold
Coast were seized by the British. These confiscations, which ef-
fectively terminated the company’s operations in India, were
quite obviously unjust, and in 1952 the British government was
forced to pay compensation to the company.54 In the case of the
Basel Trading Co., Margareth Gannon came to the conclusion
that theBritishwere verymuch ideologically biased.According to
Gannon’s assessment, the British took offence at the cultural in-
fluence of the Protestant missionary work to such an extent that
the company’s efforts to give their business an independent and
British-sanctioned basis were destined to fail.55
53 Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, Bern (BAR) E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1,
box 1, package 1: A. Eidenbenz,General Agent, BaselMission Industrials, Calicut, to
The Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, 28 Sept. 1915.
54 Adolf Wanner, Die Basler Handelsgesellschaft A.G., 1859–1959 (Basel, 1959),
376–421.
55 Margaret Gannon, ‘The Basle Mission Trading Company and British Colonial




THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL AFFILIATION
Throughout the second part of the long nineteenth century the
ideology of free trade dominated in the British Empire’s sphere of
influence.With the outbreak of the war, however, the question of
national origin suddenly took on central importance—and for
Swiss businesses it became a veritable can of worms. They in-
creasingly felt the ideological heat of the war, which sometimes
took the form of a clash of cultures, since, far away from Europe,
theBritishEmpirewas fighting awar against all thingsGerman or
German-sounding.
The British civil servants in charge of implementing the regu-
lations of the ‘trading with the enemy’ act in Asia were, however,
often fuzzy in their differentiation betweenGerman as nationality
and German as national language. A British police officer, for
example, in a report on the Bangkok firm, Berli & Co., described
it as ‘GermanSwiss underGermanprotection’. In the samedocu-
ment, Diethelm Bangkok is at one point referred to as a ‘Swiss
firm’ and at another as a ‘German firm’.56 Merchants from the
German-speaking part of Switzerland in particular were afraid
that the British would confuse them with German nationals.
The Swiss merchant Victor Zollikofer, a former employee of
Diethelm’s subsidiary, Hooglandt, who now operated his own
company inBurma, for instance, believed that ‘since the outbreak
of thewar,weSwiss have suffered greatly fromEnglish apathy and
prejudice against German-sounding names, which are con-
demned without discretion as either completely German or at
least German-friendly’.57
This new way of defining economic players according to their
country of origin was directly related to the transformation of the
First World War from being simply a military conflict between
European states to the status of global economic war. Yet firms
originating in Switzerland in particular found it no easy task to
demonstrate unambiguously to the outside world the nature of
their national identity—as the examples of Volkart andDiethelm
show. Although the associates of Volkart were Swiss, and the
56 TNA, FO 371/2465, Paper 139987: Memorandum of 28 Sept. 1915 of the
British Consulate in Siam to the Foreign Office.
57 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 6: Viktor Zollikofer,
Zollikofer & Co., Rangoon to K. Ringger, Swiss Consulate, Bombay, 31 July 1917.
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commercial operations were in fact controlled inWinterthur, the
company’s nominal head office had been transferred to London
in 1891,58 and the vast majority of its actual commercial oper-
ations were conducted in countries outside Switzerland. Because
of this, Volkart’s proprietors stated, in a letter of 1892, that ‘our
company is for the most part a foreign one and, in London and
India, is virtually understood to be English’.59
For theDiethelm company, cultural versatility, broadmultilin-
gualism, and cultural know-how constituted the most important
advantages over its competitors. The company subsidiary
Hooglandt & Co. was retained until after the Second World
War as a Dutch company, due to its comparatively easy access
to the Dutch East Indies market. Having a company division in
the British colony of Singapore was important in dealing with
British investors who wanted to access the rubber industry
during the rubber boom prior to the First World War. Through
its Saigon branch, Diethelm fostered close ties with French
manufacturers, and, through its one German shareholder, the
company hadhad connectionswith theGermanReich.The com-
pany’s multiple identity as a Dutch-Swiss firm was so important
to its patron that he continued to adhere to it even as its organ-
izational and fiscal disadvantages became clear, and even though
variousmanagers in theAsian branches considered the division to
be outdated. For example, one manager in Singapore demanded
without avail in 1917 that the head office in Zurich should pro-
ceed with the merging of Diethelm and Hooglandt, pointing to
the high costs arising from keeping books for the two companies
separately and to the additional supervisory work.60
The ability to classify the nationalities of trading companies
unambiguously was also complicated by the cosmopolitan back-
ground of employees. For multinational trading houses, with
58 The relocation to London of what was the company’s head office in name only
became necessary in the 1880s because of a change in the Swiss Code of Obligations;
commercial operations, however, actually continued to be directed by the parent
house in Winterthur: Rambousek, Vogt and Volkart, Volkart, 72ff.
59 VA, Dossier 18 – Winterthur I: 3rd Nominal transfer of HO to LONDON from
Winterthur, Volkart Brothers to the Swiss Department of Trade & Justice, Bern, 29
Nov. 1892.
60 When ordering goods from trading companies, it was common that the supplier
also purchased insurance. In Singapore, the insurance agencies were run by
Hooglandt, while Diethelm was predominantly in charge of import: DA, A 3.21:
private correspondence of W. H. Diethelm with Managers: Roest to W. H.
Diethelm, 29 Dec. 1917 and Ingold to W. H. Diethelm 21 Nov. 1917.
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their wide geographical associations, it was the rule and not the
exception that their employees were of various nationalities.
Many firms that operated in the Allied countries were forced to
lay off their German and Austrian managers during the war in
order to avoid blacklisting.61 This problem did not arise for
Diethelm, since the firm recruited exclusively Swiss and Dutch
managers. Volkart, however, had filled numerous executive pos-
itions with German employees in its London branch until the
summer of 1914. When war broke out, these employees were
either interned or else had to be laid off. With this, the company
lost a large number of its highly qualified employees at what was
an extremely critical time, because Volkart London was forced to
operate more or less without instructions fromWinterthur.62
InAsia, Swiss traders often co-operatedwith traders fromother
European nations. In Singapore, German and Swiss traders de-
veloped a specific division of labour, where the Swiss, with their
background in the textile industry, carried on the sales of
European manufactured goods (mainly cloth in the bazaar),
while the Germans were engaged in the export of produce to
Europe. This division of labour was adapted in the 1860s by all
German trading houses and, although the strict division became
blurred after a while, German and Swiss business communities
stayed in close connection up to the outbreak of the First World
War. Many firms even had both German and Swiss partners. A
typical example of this kind of association is the case of the
Sturzenegger family. Swiss merchant Conrad Sturzenegger
came to Singapore as a young man in the 1860s. He was hired
by Rautenberg & Schmidt and later became a partner in this
Hamburg company. Upon returning to Switzerland in 1880, he
started a supplier company in Schaffhausen for his partners in
Singapore and founded the German-Siamese Trading Company
in Bangkok. In 1909 Robert Sturzenegger inherited his father’s
holdings and also became partner of Rautenberg & Schmidt.
When this company was seized in 1914, he was able to collect
his share of the company and use it to start his own business. This
appeared to confirm that he had separated from his German
61 The lists of suspect companies from Siam and theDutch East Indies respectively
provide thenamesofGermanowners andmanagers:TNA,CO671/52,file 18678and
FO 371/2465, file 139987.
62 Georg Reinhart, Aus meinem Leben (Winterthur, 1931), 55; Anderegg, Volkart
Brothers, 257ff.
202 PASTAND PRESENT NUMBER 207
 
partners once and for all. Yet, when Sturzenegger’s new company
went bankrupt in 1922, it was revealed that it had maintained
close connections with his former German partners, even after
1914.63 Robert Sturzenegger was thus fortunate that his com-
pany had not ended up on the blacklist as a German cover
firm. Other Swiss merchants who tried to keep up their business
connections under the cover of newly founded companies were
less lucky. The Engler & Menzi company, which had been
founded by former partners of the Hamburg trading company
Behn, Meyer & Co., and whose commercial operations in
Bangkok they wanted to continue under a neutral flag, landed
on the blacklist, as did the business of H. C. Hanhart, a former
employee of the German company Grimm & Co in Bangkok.64
Due to such attempts at evading British war regulations, British
companies were very careful not to get involved with firms they
were not familiar with, and quite often contacted the Foreign
Office for information on suspicious circumstances surrounding
potential trading partners.
The problems experienced by Swiss trading companies in Asia
arose not only from business connections, but also as a conse-
quence of the specific cultural situation of western business
people in the Asian colonies. The employees of Swiss firms, in
both their professional and private lives, to a great extent adapted
to the lifestyles of business people from other European compa-
nies. In this, however, clear differences can be seen between the
situation in India and Singapore. On the subcontinent, Volkart
fostered close relations with the British business world and urged
its executive employees to become members of the local clubs in
order to establish ties.65 Swiss traders in Singapore, on the other
63 Over the course of the more than four-year process, the Swiss Trust Agency was
obliged to produce a report clarifying the complicated connections Robert
Sturzenegger had with the company Schmidt & Ku¨stermann in Hamburg and with
their shareholders. Although the Swiss Trust Agency came to the conclusion that
Robert Sturzenegger had been running his one-man business in Schaffhausen, and
its subsidiary in Penang, independently of theHamburg firm, the bankruptcy officials
in Penangwere – to put it mildly – very puzzled that Sturzenegger did his bookkeeping
in Hamburg: City Archives Schaffhausen, bankruptcy files Robert Sturzenegger, no
call number.
64 TNA, FO 371/2465. Siam, 1915.
65 Studienbibliothek Winterthur, Ms Sch 84/61: Georg Reinhart to Theodor
Reinhart, Tuticorin, 2 Apr. 1902; VA, Dossier 63 – ex GR perso¨nliches Archiv III,
folder: Calcutta – Wirtschaftlichkeits Probleme 1928–31: Werner Reinhart to
Winterthur, Bombay, 17 Oct. 1928.
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hand, because of their traditionally close ties with German busi-
ness people, cultivated a lively exchange, and socialized privately,
withGermans. Their everyday business life wasmultilingual, but
in leisure time German was the favoured language. The German
Club Teutonia always had a Swiss citizen as its vice-president. In
the articles of the Swiss Club, it was even explicitly laid down that
associate members had to speak German; the other two official
languages of Switzerland, Italian and French, were not used.66 In
this way, the shared German language formed a constitutive
element of their cultural practice abroad. When the war began,
this cultural relationship of the Swiss German merchants with
Germans, the shared language and the sympathies for
Germany, proved a handicap. As described above, the accusation
of being German-friendly could be taken just as seriously as
actual trading with the enemy.
In the course of the wartime years, efforts were made by Great
Britain and the colonial administration to legally establish the
identity of ambiguous companies. Due to the strict Companies
Ordinance in Singapore in 1916, Diethelm and its Dutch subsid-
iary, Hooglandt, were forced to institute separate bookkeeping.
Diethelm had to add ‘Incorporated in Switzerland’ to its com-
pany name and have its statutes translated into English, notarized
in Zurich and certified by the British consulate for submission to
theRegistrar ofCompanies. Its financial statements alsohad tobe
translated into English and legally attested.67
In 1917, the British Business Registration Act required foreign
companies to include the names and nationalities of their owners
on all business documents.68 Volkart’s principals in Winterthur
reacted positively to this new regulation, as they thought that such
a declarationwould disperse doubt about the company’s origin.69
They advocated that every business letter should be headed with
66 W. H. Diethelm, J. R. Riedtmann-Naef, W. Stiefel, partners in the company
Diethelm & Co., that is, Hooglandt & Co. all acted as vice-presidents for Teutonia
at the end of the nineteenth century. On the Swiss Club in Singapore, see: Hans
Schweizer-Iten, One Hundred Years of the Swiss Club, 1871–1971 (Dalkeith, 1980).
67 DA, 2.2: Hans Schweizer-Iten, ‘Das Haus Diethelm 1860–1973’, unpublished
manuscript 1973, 735.
68 Anderegg, Volkart Brothers, 250.
69 VA, Dossier 13 – London/Liverpool (VOLKART þ Woods & Thorburn)/
Bremen: 7. Proclamations during First World War: Winterthur to London, 30 Jan.
1917.
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‘Volkart Brothers . . . Partners: Theodor Reinhart, George
Reinhart, Werner Reinhart, Oscar Reinhart, Swiss Firm estab-
lished 1851’. Certain branch offices in India, however, believed
that next to the names of the partners on the letterhead it should
be explicitly stated, ‘Nationality and Origin: Swiss’. They based
their argument on the problems experienced by theBaselTrading
Co., a company which, despite its Swiss origins, had come under
British control: ‘Here in South India, we have had before us the
example of the Basel Mission Industries, which, though giving
itself out as a Swiss concern, has been proved to be considerably
adulterated with Enemy capital and partners, so much so that a
polemic has been going on for ever so long in the papers about the
right of such a concern to call itself ‘‘Swiss’’. . . . [W]e are natur-
ally anxious that no such suspicions against us . . . should ever
arise again’.70 In the end, however, the principals asserted them-
selves on their recommendation for the phrasing of the
letterhead.71
IV
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SWISS CONSULATES IN ASIA
The First WorldWar not only led to a closer connection between
transnationally operating trading companies and the Swiss nation
on a symbolic level; it also did so structurally.Oneof the problems
experienced by Swiss business people and companies at the be-
ginning of the First World War was the insufficient consular rep-
resentation of their country in South and South-east Asia. In the
Middle and Far East, only Manila (since 1862), Jakarta (1863)
and Yokohama (1866) had Swiss consulates; in British India,
from today’s Pakistan to Singapore, the Confederation had no
consulates. As early as 1885, Volkart had asked the Swiss
Federal Council how the protection of their Indian branches
could be assured in case of war and, as was common at the
time, received the response that Swiss firms in countries without
Swiss consulates were free to choose the country they wished to
represent them. Since 1871, agreements were effective with
70 VA, Dossier 18 – Winterthur I: 1. Table of Events – 1917: copy of the letter in
question, no place and date.
71 VA, Dossier 13 – London/Liverpool (VOLKART þ Woods & Thorburn)/




Germany and the United States, in which these countries would
provide consular protection if required. At this time, Volkart
decided on US representation, as the company feared that diffi-
culties might arise in the event of a future European war if their
Indian branches were under the consular protection of the
German Reich.72 In common with many other firms, Diethelm
decided to be represented by the German Reich, a move that was
probably founded on close relationships with Germans in their
daily business activities as well as on the basis of cultural and
linguistic solidarity felt by many business people from
German-speaking Switzerland.
With the outbreak of the First World War, it became obvious
that Switzerland should have its own consulates. Before the out-
break of the war, Switzerland possessed only eleven embassies
abroad, which was a modest number in comparison with other
European states of similar size. To compensate for this,
Switzerland had a network of honorary consulates at its disposal.
These consulates had often been founded in response to requests
by Swiss people abroad, and they were generally headed by busi-
ness people who resided locally. In this way, trading companies
took on a para-national function.73 As the awarding of consular
positions was not tied to citizenship, Volkart’s various branch
directors on the Indian subcontinent were able, from the
middle of the nineteenth century, to act as consuls for Belgium,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Germany, among other
countries.74 Wilhelm H. Diethelm served as a Russian consul
and, upon returning, as a consul for Denmark in Zurich.75
From the beginning of the First World War until the 1920s, a
host of Swiss consulates were established in the Middle and Far
East: in Bombay in 1915, in Colombo, Singapore and Medan
72 BAR, E2, 1477: correspondence of Volkart and the Federal Political
Department, 25 Apr./27 Apr./1 May 1885.
73 Karl Rohner, Die Schweizer Wirtschaftsvertretungen im Ausland (Bern, 1944), 21;
Claude Altermatt, Zwei Jahrhunderte Schweizer Auslandvertretungen (Bern, 1990); on
the significance of the Swiss economy for foreign policy, compare also: Hansjo¨rg
Siegenthaler, ‘Die Bedeutung des Aussenhandels fu¨r die Ausbildung einer schweizer-
ischen Wachstumsgesellschaft im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert’, in Nicolai Bernard and
Quirinus Reichen (eds.), Gesellschaft und Gesellschaften (Bern, 1982), 325–40.
74 VA, Dossier 1 – Die Teilhaber I: A) Die Familie der Gru¨nder, Johann Georg
Volkart; Dossier 6 – Colombo: 3. European staff lists; Dossier 8 – Karachi: 1.
Management.
75 Bartu, The Fan Tree Company, 56–7.
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(Sumatra) in 1917, in Shanghai and Canton in 1921, inMadras,
Calcutta and Bangkok in 1922, and in Saigon in 1926. In
Bombay, Colombo and Madras, the directors of Volkart’s local
branch offices were appointed consul by the Swiss government,
and in Singapore, Saigon and Bangkok, the managers of
Diethelm. The principals inWinterthur and Zurich actively sup-
ported them in this.76 The fact that trading companies like
Volkart and Diethelm were prepared, as companies operating in
highly competitive business sectors, to allow their executives to
take on the honorary position of consul, requires explanation.
The position was, after all, quite time-consuming.77 In spite of
this, Swiss merchants applied for the position of honorary consul
in various parts ofAsia after the outbreakof thewar.This couldbe
explained by the inherent patriotism of these companies, but
therewas clearly an economic reason aswell. An executive serving
as Swiss Consul gained access to decision-makers abroad in the
event of a political crisis.
Hence, in December 1915, the Swiss merchant Victor
Zollikofer, residing in Burma, sent an urgent message to the re-
cently appointed Swiss Consul in Bombay. Zollikofer had heard
rumours that even citizens of neutral countries were to be in-
terned in Burma.78 He feared ‘malicious defamation’ from
British tradesmen. In a second letter to the consul at the end of
January 1916, Zollikofer emphasized that he was certain that
‘there is a fair share of competitive manoeuvring at the bottom
of it all’.79 To avoid internment and bankruptcy, Zollikofer asked
the consul directly if he could be appointed ‘Acting Swiss Consul
or else, should this not lie within your power, for you to take the
76 On the establishment of the consulate in Colombo, see for instance: BAR, E
2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 13.
77 For example, Jean Frei, the manager of the Volkart branch in Madras, reported
spending two to three hours a day on consular duties: BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay),
ref. no. 1, dossier no. 1, Apr. 1924 to Feb. 1925: Volkart Brothers, Winterthur, to the
Federal Political Department, Department of External Affaires, Bern, 1 Apr. 1924.
78 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 1: Victor Zollikofer from
Firma V. Zollikofer & Co., Rangoon, to K. Ringger, Swiss Consul, Bombay, 20 Dec.
1915.
79 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 4: Victor Zollikofer from




matter to Switzerland, that is, recommend the idea to the Swiss
Federal Council.’80
Writing to Bombay in the summer of 1917, Zollikofer renewed
his request that he becomeSwissConsul forBurma, claiming that
Switzerland did not have an adequate number of consulates
abroad, especially overseas. A Swiss consulate would be particu-
larly appropriate, he argued, in guaranteeing some protection for
Swiss citizens living in Burma. As already mentioned, Zollikofer
accused the British of regarding anything German-sounding as
German-friendly: ‘These circumstances will persist for many
years to come & so it would be most desirable to counteract this
formidable evil with the establishment of a consulate’.81 The
Federal Council, however, rejected Zollikofer’s recommenda-
tion, noting that only a small number of Swiss citizens were
living in Burma.82
Volkart also hoped to profit from Karl Ringger’s double role as
employee of the company and Swiss consul, when in 1917,
Volkart Karachi was prohibited from engaging in the lucrative
trade in hides.83 In response, Volkart asked the Swiss embassy
in London to take up the matter.84 It seemed convenient in this
situation that, with Karl Ringger, the Swiss consul for India was
an employee of the firm.85 Yet Ringger’s efforts remained unsuc-
cessful. In January 1918, the Indian government informed him
80 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 1: Victor Zollikofer from
Firma V. Zollikofer & Co., Rangoon, to K. Ringger, Swiss Consul, Bombay, 20 Dec.
1915.
81 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 6: Viktor Zollikofer,
Zollikofer & Co., Rangoon to K. Ringger, Swiss Consulate, Bombay, 31 July 1917.
82 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 9, Swiss Consulate Rangoon:
Schweizerischer Generalkonsul, Bombay, to the Consular Service of the Federal
Political Department, Bern, 5 July 1928
83 Volkart was able to export 121,755 hides in 1915 and 122,750 in 1916, whereas
in 1914 it had only been 14,600. The majority of the hides went to Italy: BAR, E
2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 2: Volkart Brothers, London, to Swiss
Legation, London, 12 July 1917.
84 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 2: Volkart Brothers,
London, to Swiss Legation, London, 12 July 1917.
85 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay), ref. no. 1, box 1, package 2: Volkart Brothers,
Winterthur, to the Swiss Consulate, Bombay, 19 Sept. 1917. What is interesting
about the correspondence between Volkart’s headquarters and Karl Ringger is that
the Winterthur office did not address its letters to its own employee but to ‘the Swiss
Consulate’ in Bombay. The distinction between Ringger’s function as director of
Volkart Bombay and as Swiss consul was therefore made explicit. This was likely
done so as not to undermine Ringger’s position as official representative of Swiss
interests through the semblance of bias.
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that Volkart Karachi’s request to be allowed to take part in the
trade in hides had been dismissed.86
V
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR FOR SWISS TRADING COMPANIES
IN THE POST-WAR YEARS
The First World War brought about a radical shift in the
world economic balance. Alongside the United States, it was
mostly Asian countries that gained economic influence in the
process, while the economic importance of European countries
declined.87 This was a direct result of the war. In several Asian
countries, the trade and submarine wars had led to a reduction of
imports fromEurope and to increaseddomestic industrialization.
The Japanese economy in particular experienced a boom after
1914.88 Furthermore, there were fewer exports from Asia to
Europe during the war, while the volume of inner-Asian and
trans-Pacific trade increased. At the outset of the war, a more or
less equal amount of raw materials (especially sugar, coffee, nat-
ural rubber, tobacco, tea, and cinchona bark) was exported from
theDutch East Indies to European and non-European countries.
At the end of the war, exports to Europe had declined to almost a
sixth, while non-European exports had doubled. Exports to
the United States and Japan in particular skyrocketed.89 The
trade war also led to new transport links with Asia. To avoid the
strict British control of goods traffic, the Netherlands established
a new shipping route from the Dutch East Indies via Japan to the
USA. Apart from the Batavia-San Francisco route, shipping
routes from Japan and China to California also became increas-
ingly important. Finally, US companies such as Goodyear and
86 BAR, E 2200.110 (Bombay) ref. no. 1, box 1, package 3: Government of India,
Indian Munitions Board, Delhi, to the Consul of Switzerland, Bombay, 2 Jan. 1918.
87 Niall Fergusson therefore regards the FirstWorldWar as the start of an economic
and political shift of power from Europe towards Asia. According to Fergusson, Asia
will thus slowly regain the geopolitical significance that it had at the beginning of the
Industrial Age. Niall Fergusson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and
the Descent of the West (New York, 2006).
88 Nobuo Kawabe, ‘Development of Overseas Operations by General Trading
Companies, 1868–1945’, in Shin’ichi Yonekawa and Hideki Yoshihara (eds.),
Business History of General Trading Companies (Tokyo, 1987), 71–103.
89 Emil Helfferich, Die Wirtschaft Niederla¨ndisch-Indiens im Weltkriege und heute:




StandardOil initiated, or strengthened, their business operations
in theDutchEast Indies during theFirstWorldWar andwere able
to increase their influence in the region steadily until the Second
World War.90
The war also destabilized the basic parameters of the global
economy. After 1918, numerous political and economic attempts
were made to restore the economic ‘normalcy’ of pre-war times.
In the end, however, none of the attempts met with success.
Because a restoration of the gold standard failed, and protection-
ist economic policies saw a revival in the inter-war period, inter-
national trade experienced a profound crisis which was
heightened by the stock-market crash of 1929. As a result, the
volume of worldwide trade during the inter-war period was, on
average, around 20 per cent below what it had been in 1913.91
The current literature on this subject usually supports the thesis
that there was an initial phase of economic globalization that
lasted from 1800 to 1914, which was followed by a phase that
may be called de-globalization with respect to trade, and which
lasted until the end of the Second World War.92 With respect to
individual enterprises, however, it can in no way be argued that
after 1918 theyonlyoperatedwithin the confines of certain nation
states. On the contrary, a number of companies strengthened
their foreign investments in the period between the wars in
order to counter the increased protectionism and to be on the
market in other countries through subsidiary companies. Many
companies, indeed, only became globally operating enterprises
during this period.93
For the Swiss trading companies Diethelm and Volkart, the
First World War and the post-war period required a reorganiza-
tion of their business activities.Diethelm, for instance, intensified
their involvement in the plantation business which they had
90 James W. Gould, Americans in Sumatra (Den Haag, 1961), chs. 2 and 3.
91 W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Survey 1919 to 1939 (London, 1970), 59–72.
92 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991
(London, 1995), 88–9; O’Brien, ‘The Great War’, 252–63; Osterhammel and
Petersson, Geschichte der Globalisierung, 77–83 and 93–100.
93 Jones, ‘The End of Nationality’, 164; Margrit Mu¨ller argues that the regional
pattern of Swiss exports became more global after 1918 with 30 per cent of exports
going to Asia and the Americas: Margrit Mu¨ller, ‘From Protectionism to Market
Liberalisation: Patterns of Internationalisation in the Main Swiss Export Sectors’,
in Margrit Mu¨ller and Timo Myllyntaus (eds.), Path Breakers: Small European
Countries Responding to Globalisation and De-globalisation (Bern, 2008), 113–49.
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begun before the war during the rubber boom. In this, the com-
pany profited from the fact that plantations in the Dutch East
Indies especially had flourished during the war despite trade re-
strictions, because exports to Japan and the United States had
increased substantially. But while in the beginning Diethelm’s
participation was more speculative, after 1918 it became more
strategic as the company became a major supplier of aluminium
tools used in raw rubber production. For this purpose, they set up
a small factory in Singapore. The tools manufactured in
Singapore made rubber production more economical and were
soon used the world over.94
While Diethelm & Co. continued to limit itself to South-east
Asia in the inter-war period, opening new branches on theMalay
Peninsula in Penang (1923) and Ipoh (1929), as well as in
Haiphong (1924) and Hanoi (1926) in French Indochina,95
Volkart developed into a global player after 1918. Between
1919 and 1922—years of dire crisis for many European indus-
trial enterprises—Volkart Bros. achieved record profits. In the
first post-war years, the company benefited from the high
demand for raw materials in countries damaged by the war,
which kept prices, and companies’ trade margins, high. The suc-
cessful trading years seemed to have confirmed the belief of
Volkart’s directors that international trade after 1918 would
return to pre-war levels, and great efforts toward expansion
were therefore taken in the early 1920s. New subsidiary compa-
nies and branch offices were founded in quick succession in
Osaka (1919), Bremen (1920), New York (1920), Shanghai
(1921), and Singapore (1924). Through its entry into the
North American cotton market and its intensified activities in
East Asia after 1930 in particular, Volkart became truly a
globally operating trading company.96
For Volkart, however, extending the area of operations globally
led to a stronger commitment to the company’s national origin as
a direct result of the experiences of the First World War. In an
internal memorandumof 1939, Georg Reinhard, one of the part-
ners, noted: ‘We are a Swiss company (Thank God!) and want to
keep it this way’. While, prior to the First World War, numerous
94 Eggenberger, Das Haus Diethelm im Wandel der Zeit, 153.
95 Eggenberger, Das Haus Diethelm im Wandel der Zeit, 127–8, 153.
96 Rambousek, Vogt and Volkart, Volkart, 81–6.
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executive positions (for example in the London office) were filled
by employees from Germany—all of whom were detained fol-
lowing the outbreak of war— in the post-war era the company
adopted a policy of filling ‘executive positions . . . only with
Swiss citizens of proven character’. In Reinhart’s view, only
from such persons could one expect ‘that, in foreign countries,
they will be fully committed to the company out of patriotism.
The English, American,German, or Japanese employeemay find
himself in situationswhere his patriotism comes into conflict with
his duty toward the company’.97 This policy was consistent with
the endeavours of many Swiss enterprises to get rid of foreign
capital and foreign members of their governing boards and to
accentuate their ‘Swissness’ after 1918.98 It can be seen as a
sign of the fact that globalization and nationalization are not ne-
cessarily diametrically opposed developments, but rather two
sides of the same coin, and often dialectally intertwined.99 In
the case of Volkart, this strategy proved successful during the
SecondWorldWar, as it prevented thefirm from losing employees
to detention and, as Reinhart noted contentedly in a memoran-
dum in 1944, it led to the fact that ‘not for a moment was our
company suspected of being anything but Swiss and Swiss alone’.
Many German and Japanese citizens indeed filled executive pos-
itions in the Volkart subsidiaries in Bremen and Osaka, but the
commercial operations of Volkart’s other branches were not af-
fected by this because the two companies were legally independ-
ent subsidiaries.100
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that an examination of
the economic effects of theGreatWar from themicro-perspective
97 VA,Dossier 62– exGRperso¨nlichesArchiv II,TheFamilyCodeof theHouseof
Mitsui, Japan, aufgestellt im siebzehnten Jahrhundert und mein Kommentar dazu
vom 10./11. November 1939, 19–21.
98 Martin Lu¨pold, ‘Wirtschaftskrieg, Aktienrecht und Corporate Governance:
Der Kampf der Schweizer Wirtschaft gegen die ‘‘wirtschaftliche U¨berfremdung’’ im
Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Valentin Groebner, Se´bastien Guex and Jakob
Tanner (eds.), Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftskriege (Zu¨rich, 2008), 99–115.
99 See Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the
Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1997); Sebastian Conrad, Globalisierung und Nation im
Deutschen Kaiserreich (Mu¨nchen, 2006).
100 VA, Doss. 63 – ex GR perso¨nliches Archiv III, Richtlinien fu¨r unsere Gescha¨ft-
sta¨tigkeit: Memorandum by GR, 28 Apr. 1944.
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of individual firms can offer new insights into the cataclysm this
conflict brought for the global economy, and into the difficulties
faced bymultinational companies. The increasing restrictions on
trade as a result of economic warfare definitely put an end to the
economic cosmopolitanism of the nineteenth century and up-
rooted multinational companies from the socio-cultural and
legal environment in which they had flourished before 1914.
After the outbreak of the war, even firms operating multination-
ally were forced to subject themselves to the cultural concept of a
distinct national origin, even though—or precisely because—
their actual operations and the constitution of their staff or their
associateswere often at oddswith this concept. Such aheightened
awareness of the nationality of enterprises had not been custom-
ary prior to the war.
The belligerents’ measures of economic warfare, however, not
only affected business during wartime, but had an impact on the
cultural imprint of global trade and the strategies of individual
companies well after 1918. The Swiss trading firms Volkart and
Diethelm strove, on the one hand, to expand their sphere of ac-
tivity in order to find newmarkets in East and South-east Asia or
in the USA, and thus to counter the protectionist mood and the
restrictions they were facing in post-war Europe. On the other
hand, they continued to emphasize their ‘Swissness’, since they
had learned during the war that, while operating in foreign mar-
kets, the fact that they originated from a neutral country could
provide a certain protection in the event of a political crisis. This
article, therefore, shows the extent to which the relationship be-
tween commerce and state power was renegotiated as a conse-
quence of the war. Furthermore, it points out that globalization
and nationalization were not necessarily diametrically opposed
developments but often dialectically intertwined.
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